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Abstract
Logics for knowledge representation suffer from over-
specialization: while each logic may provide an ideal repre-
sentation formalism for some problems, it is less than optimal
for others. A solution to this problem is to choose from sev-
eral logics and, when necessary, combine the representations.
In general, such an approach results in a very difficult prob-
lem of combination. However, if we can choose the logics
from a uniform framework then the problem of combining
them is greatly simplified. In this paper, we develop such
a framework for defeasible logics. It supports all defeasible
logics that satisfy a strong negation principle. We use logic
meta-programs as the basis for the framework.
Introduction
Logics for knowledge representation and, in particular, non-
monotonic logics have developed greatly over the past 20
years. Many logics have been proposed, and a deeper under-
standing of the advantages and disadvantages of particular
logics has been developed. There are also, finally, some in-
dications that these logics can be usefully applied (Morgen-
stern 1998; Prakken 1997).
Unfortunately, it appears that no single logic is appropri-
ate in all situations, or for all purposes. History clearly in-
dicates that while one logic may achieve desired results in
some situations, in other situations the outcome is not as suc-
cessful. This is, no doubt, one reason for the proliferation of
non-monotonic logics.
Furthermore, even with a fixed syntax and a common mo-
tivating intuition, reasonable people can disagree on the se-
mantics of the logic. This can be seen in the literature on
semantics of logic programs with negation, for example, but
the point was made more sharply in (Touretzky, Horty and
Thomason 1987) where a “clash of intuitions” was demon-
strated in several different ways for a simple language de-
scribing multiple inheritance with exceptions. So it appears
that no single logic, with a fixed semantics, will be appro-
priate.
However, the diversity of logics threatens to become a
Tower of Babel. If different problems require different log-
ics then there are many practical disadvantages: skills in one
logic do not transfer to another, combining systems com-
posed of different logics is problematic, etc. It seems un-
likely then that these logics are practically useful for knowl-
edge representation.
One way to address this problem is to develop logics that
are “tunable” to the situation. That is, to develop a frame-
work of logics in which an appropriate logic can be de-
signed. However, such a framework is not sufficient. Also
needed is a methodology for designing logics, and the capa-
bility of employing more than one such logic in a represen-
tation.
In this paper we develop such a framework for defeasi-
ble logics. This is a first step towards addressing the above
problem for knowledge representation logics more gener-
ally. We make some contributions to the methodology by
demonstrating how certain properties can be ensured for a
logic. However, there is still much work to be done.
Defeasible logics were introduced and developed by Nute
over several years (Nute 1994). These logics perform de-
feasible reasoning, where a conclusion supported by a rule
might be overturned by the effect of another rule. Roughly, a
proposition p can be defeasibly proved only when a rule sup-
ports it, and it has been demonstrated that no rule supports
¬p. These logics also have a monotonic reasoning compo-
nent, and a priority on rules. One advantage of these logics
is that the cost of computing with them is low (Antoniou,
Billington, Maher and Rock 2000), in contrast to most log-
ics for knowledge representation.
Nute has developed a framework for defeasible logic
that abstracts the many individual logics he has constructed
(Nute 1994). Although there are some logics in Nute’s
framework that cannot be represented in our framework, we
will address logics that go well beyond the family of log-
ics addressed by Nute. We consider logics that admit more
kinds of conclusions than statements of definite or defeasible
proof, as well as logics with different notions of failure-to-
prove than the one used in Nute’s framework.
In the next section we introduce defeasible logics in gen-
eral and one particular defeasible logic DL. We introduce
the Principle of Strong Negation as a design criterion for de-
feasible logics. In the following sections we demonstrate the
framework, first by applying it to DL and then by designing
independently motivated variants of DL. We also compare
it with Nute’s framework. In the process, we clarify the rela-
tionship between defeasible logics and other non-monotonic
logics.
Defeasible Logics
The family of defeasible logics was introduced by Nute. We
begin by outlining the constructs in defeasible logics. We
then define the inference rules of a particular defeasible logic
DL that has received the most attention. Finally, we intro-
duce the Principle of Strong Negation.
Outline of Defeasible Logics
A defeasible theory D is a triple (F,R,>) where F is a
set of literals (called facts), R a finite set of rules, and >
a superiority relation on R. In expressing the proof theory
we consider only propositional rules. Rules containing free
variables are interpreted as the set of their variable-free in-
stances.
There are three kinds of rules: Strict rules are denoted by
A → p, and are interpreted in the classical sense: when-
ever the premises are indisputable (e.g. facts) then so is the
conclusion. An example of a strict rule is “Emus are birds”.
Written formally:
emu(X)→ bird(X).
Inference from facts and strict rules only is called definite
inference. Facts and strict rules are intended to define re-
lationships that are definitional in nature. Thus defeasible
logics contain no mechanism for resolving inconsistencies
in definite inference.
Defeasible rules are denoted by A ⇒ p, and can be de-
feated by contrary evidence. An example of such a rule is
bird(X)⇒ flies(X)
which reads as follows: “Birds typically fly”.
Defeaters are denoted by A ; p and are used to prevent
some conclusions. In other words, they are used to defeat
some defeasible rules by producing evidence to the contrary.
An example is the rule
heavy(X); ¬flies(X)
which reads as follows: “If an animal is heavy then it may
not be able to fly”. The main point is that the information
that an animal is heavy is not sufficient evidence to conclude
that it doesn’t fly. It is only evidence that the animal may not
be able to fly.
A superiority relation on R is an acyclic relation > on
R (that is, the transitive closure of > is irreflexive). When
r1 > r2, then r1 is called superior to r2, and r2 inferior to
r1. This expresses that r1 may override r2. For example,
given the defeasible rules
r : bird(X) ⇒ flies(X)
r′ : brokenWing(X) ⇒ ¬flies(X)
which contradict one another, no conclusive decision can be
made about whether a bird with a broken wing can fly. But
if we introduce a superiority relation > with r′ > r, then we
can indeed conclude that it cannot fly.
A conclusion of a defeasible theory D is a tagged literal.
Conventionally (Nute 1994; Billington 1993) there are four
tags, so a conclusion has one of the following four forms:
• +∆q, which is intended to mean that q is definitely prov-
able in D.
• −∆q, which is intended to mean that we have proved that
q is not definitely provable in D.
• +∂q, which is intended to mean that q is defeasibly prov-
able in D.
• −∂q which is intended to mean that we have proved that
q is not defeasibly provable in D.
Although the two pairs of tags mentioned above are the
only ones currently used in defeasible logics, we will leave
open the possibility of further (pairs of) tags. Indeed, we
will later introduce in our framework the notion of support
for a conclusion, which would require new tags in order to
express this notion in a proof theory in the style of the next
section.
Nute’s Framework
Nute’s framework for defeasible reasoning (Nute 1994) is
based around defining a class of proof trees which represent
valid inferences. We can reformulate this in terms of con-
ventional inference rules, but we do not have space for a
detailed presentation.
Briefly, Nute’s framework consists of four inference rules
which partly specify the behaviour of the definite (mono-
tonic) reasoning component and its relationship with the de-
feasible (non-monotonic) reasoning component. Nute de-
fines a defeasible logic to be a logic containing this mono-
tonic kernel of inference rules and satisfying a coherence
property. He also discusses several design principles of de-
feasible logics, but these are not a part of his framework.
A Defeasible Logic
As an example of a defeasible logic, we consider the logic
of (Nute 1987), which we have investigated previously (An-
toniou, Billington and Maher 1998; Maher, Antoniu and
Billington 1998). In this presentation we use the formulation
given in (Billington 1993). We denote this logic by DL.
Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of all strict rules
in R by Rs, the set of strict and defeasible rules in R by
Rsd, the set of defeasible rules in R by Rd, and the set of
defeaters in R by Rdft. R[q] denotes the set of rules in R
with consequent q. In the following∼p denotes the comple-
ment of p, that is, ∼p is ¬p if p is an atom, and ∼p is q if p
is ¬q.
A rule r consists of its antecedent A(r) (written on the
left; A(r) may be omitted if it is the empty set) which is a fi-
nite set of literals, an arrow, and its consequent C(r) which
is a literal. In writing rules we omit set notation for an-
tecedents.
Provability is defined below. It is based on the concept
of a derivation (or proof) in D = (F,R,>). A derivation
is a finite sequence P = (P (1), . . . P (n)) of tagged liter-
als satisfying the following conditions. The conditions are
essentially inference rules phrased as conditions on proofs.
P (1..i) denotes the initial part of the sequence P of length
i.
+∆: If P (i+ 1) = +∆q then either
q ∈ F or
∃r ∈ Rs[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a ∈ P (1..i)
−∆: If P (i+ 1) = −∆q then
q 6∈ F and
∀r ∈ Rs[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∆a ∈ P (1..i)
+∂: If P (i+ 1) = +∂q then either
(1) +∆q ∈ P (1..i) or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.2) −∆ ∼q ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd[q] such that
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and t > s
−∂: If P (i+ 1) = −∂q then
(1) −∆q ∈ P (1..i) and
(2) (2.1) ∀r ∈ Rsd[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.2) +∆ ∼q ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
(2.3.1) ∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.3.2) ∀t ∈ Rsd[q] either
∃a ∈ A(t) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or t 6> s
The elements of a derivation are called lines of the deriva-
tion. We say that a tagged literal L is provable in D =
(F,R,>), denoted by D ` L, iff there is a derivation in D
such that L is a line of P .
DL is closely related to several non-monotonic log-
ics (Antoniou, Billington and Maher 2000). In particu-
lar, the “directly skeptical” semantics of non-monotonic in-
heritance networks (Horty, Thomason and Touretzky 1987;
Horty 1994) can be considered an instance of inference in
DL once an appropriate superiority relation, derived from
the topology of the network, is fixed (Billington, de Coster,
and Nute 1990). DL is a conservative logic, in the sense of
Wagner (Wagner 1991).
The Principle of Strong Negation
The purpose of the −∆ and −∂ inference rules is to estab-
lish that it is not possible to prove a corresponding positive
tagged literal. These rules are defined in such a way that all
the possibilities for proving +∂q (for example) are explored
and shown to fail before −∂q can be concluded. Thus con-
clusions with these tags are the outcome of a constructive
proof that the corresponding positive conclusion cannot be
obtained.
As a result, there is a close relationship between the infer-
ence rules for +∂ and −∂, (and also between those for +∆
and −∆). The structure of the inference rules is the same,
but the conditions are negated in some sense. We say that
the inference rule for +∂ (−∂) is the strong negation of the
inference rule for −∂ (+∂).
The strong negation of a formula is closely related to the
function that simplifies a formula by moving all negations to
an innermost position in the resulting formula. It is defined
as follows.
sneg(+∂p ∈ X) = −∂p ∈ X
sneg(−∂p ∈ X) = +∂p ∈ X
sneg(A ∧B) = sneg(A) ∨ sneg(B)
sneg(A ∨B) = sneg(A) ∧ sneg(B)
sneg(∃x A) = ∀x sneg(A)
sneg(∀x A) = ∃x sneg(A)
sneg(¬A) = ¬sneg(A)
sneg(A) = ¬A if A is a pure formula
A pure formula is a formula that does not contain a tagged
literal. Pairs of tags other than +∂,−∂ are treated in an anal-
ogous manner to +∂ and −∂. The strong negation of the
applicability condition of an inference rule is a constructive
approximation of the conditions where the rule is not appli-
cable.
We are led to consider the following Principle of Strong
Negation:
For each pair of tags such as+∂,−∂, the inference rule
for −∂ should be the strong negation of the inference
rule of +∂ (and vice versa).
Clearly DL satisfies this principle. In fact, all logics in our
framework satisfy it. On the other hand, in Nute’s frame-
work (Nute 1994) logics may violate it.
There are two other important properties that defeasible
logics may have. A theory is coherent if there is no p such
that D ` +∂p and D ` −∂p, or D ` +∆p and D ` −∆p.
A theory is consistent if for every p such that D ` +∂p and
D ` +∂¬p, also D ` +∆p and D ` +∆¬p. Intuitively,
coherence says that no literal is simultaneously provable and
demonstrably unprovable. Consistency says that a literal and
its negation can both be defeasibly provable only when it
and its negation are definitely provable; hence defeasible
inference does not introduce inconsistency. (As noted ear-
lier, definite provability is intended for definitional informa-
tion, and has no mechanism for resolving inconsistencies.)
A logic is coherent (consistent) if each theory of the logic is
coherent (consistent). The above logic DL is coherent and
consistent (Billington 1993).
A Framework of Defeasible Logics
Our framework consists of a meta-program, defining when
an atom is definitely or defeasibly proved, and a seman-
tics for the meta-language (which is logic programming).
In (Maher and Governatori 1999) it was shown how DL is
amenable to definition in this framework. We first introduce
the meta-program for DL as a first example of the frame-
work, and then derive some properties of the framework and
the logics that can be defined within it. We make a compar-
ison with Nute’s framework.
The DL Meta-program
In this section we introduce a meta-program M in a logic
programming form that expresses the essence of the defeasi-
ble reasoning embedded inDL. M consists of the following
clauses. We first introduce the predicates defining classes of
rules, namely
supportive rule(Name,Head,Body):-
strict(Name,Head,Body).
supportive rule(Name,Head,Body):-
defeasible(Name,Head,Body).
rule(Name,Head,Body):-
supportive rule(Name,Head,Body).
rule(Name,Head,Body):-
defeater(Name,Head,Body).
We introduce now the clauses defining the predicates corre-
sponding to +∆, −∆, +∂, and −∂. These clauses specify
the structure of defeasible reasoning in DL. Arguably they
convey the conceptual simplicity of DL more clearly than
the proof theory.
c1 definitely(X):-
fact(X).
c2 definitely(X):-
strict(R,X, [Y1, . . . , Yn]),
definitely(Y1),. . . ,definitely(Yn).
c3 defeasibly(X):-
definitely(X).
c4 defeasibly(X):-
not definitely(∼ X),
supportive rule(R,X, [Y1, . . . , Yn]),
defeasibly(Y1),. . . ,defeasibly(Yn),
not overruled(R,X).
c5 overruled(R,X):-
rule(S,∼ X, [U1, . . . , Un]),
defeasibly(U1),. . . ,defeasibly(Un),
not defeated(S,∼ X).
c6 defeated(S,∼ X):-
sup(T, S),
supportive rule(T,X, [V1, . . . , Vn]),
defeasibly(V1),. . . ,defeasibly(Vn).
The first two clauses address definite provability, while
the remainder address defeasible provability. The clauses
specify if and how a rule in DL can be overridden by an-
other, and which rules can be used to defeat an overriding
rule, among other aspects of the structure of defeasible rea-
soning in DL.
We have permitted ourselves some syntactic flexibility in
presenting the meta-program. However, there is no technical
difficulty in using conventional logic programming syntax to
represent this program.
Given a defeasible theoryD = (F,R,>), the correspond-
ing program D is obtained from M by adding facts accord-
ing to the following guidelines:
1. fact(p). for each p ∈ F
2. strict(ri, p, [q1, . . . , qn]). for each rule
ri : q1, . . . , qn → p ∈ R
3. defeasible(ri, p, [q1, . . . , qn]). for each rule
ri : q1, . . . , qn ⇒ p ∈ R
4. defeater(ri, p, [q1, . . . , qn]). for each rule
ri : q1, . . . , qn ; p ∈ R
5. sup(ri, rj). for each pair of rules such that ri > rj
The Framework
In previous work (Maher and Governatori 1999) we have
established the correctness of this meta-program represen-
tation for DL. Let |=K denote logical consequence under
Kunen’s semantics of logic programs (Kunen 1987).
Theorem 1 Let D be a defeasible theory and D denote its
meta-program counterpart.
For each literal p,
1. D ` +∆p iff D |=K definitely(p);
2. D ` −∆p iff D |=K ¬definitely(p);
3. D ` +∂p iff D |=K defeasibly(p);
4. D ` −∂p iff D |=K ¬defeasibly(p);
A significant aspect of this result deserves further com-
ment. Negative conclusions (involving tags −∆ and −∂),
which refer to failure to prove, are characterized by the nega-
tion of the positive conclusions. Thus the meta-program im-
plements failure as negation.
More generally, this provides a point of comparison be-
tween defeasible logics and other non-monotonic logics: in
defeasible logics failure is the basic notion, whereas nega-
tion is basic in most other non-monotonic logics. Neverthe-
less, these two notions are different sides of the same coin.
An important feature of the meta-programming frame-
work for defeasible logic is that it admits different forms
of failure, corresponding to different semantics of negation
in logic programs. For example, under the Kunen semantics
(and hence in DL) with the program
p⇒ p
we cannot conclude −∂p, even though it is clear that +∂p
will never be concluded. Under the well-founded semantics
(Van Gelder, Ross and Schlipf 1991) we can conclude −∂p.
(Maher and Governatori 1999) contains the definition of a
defeasible logic that results from using the well-founded se-
mantics with the above meta-program M.
Our framework consists of a meta-program defining
defeasibly and definitely, among other predicates, the
implicit definition of negative tags by the negation of these
predicates, and a semantics for the meta-language (logic
programming).
Every logic defined within the framework satisfies the
Principle of Strong Negation, by construction. We say that a
semantics for logic programs is consistent if for no program
P and atom a does the semantics of P imply both a and ¬a
are true. Thus
Theorem 2 Every defeasible logic defined in our frame-
work using a consistent semantics is coherent.
Furthermore, containment relations among different pos-
itively tagged conclusions are reflected in the corresponding
negatively tagged conclusions. For any tag λ and logic L,
we also use λ to denote the set of literals p such that λp can
be concluded by L.
Proposition 3 Let +τ1,−τ1 and +τ2,−τ2 be pairs of tags
in a logic defined in our framework. Then +τ1 ⊆ +τ2 iff
−τ1 ⊇ −τ2.
We can characterize the extent to which Nute’s framework
is covered by ours.
Theorem 4 Every defeasible logic in Nute’s framework that
satisfies the Principle of Strong Negation can be represented
in our framework, using Kunen’s semantics.
The proof is based on the form of permitted inference rules
(Nute 1994) and the transformation of arbitrary logic formu-
las to logic programs used in (Lloyd and Topor 1984).
In view of this result and the consistency of Kunen’s se-
mantics we can establish that all such logics are coherent.
Corollary 5 Every defeasible logic in Nute’s framework
that satisfies the Principle of Strong Negation is coherent.
The presence of the Kunen semantics provides substan-
tial insight into the computational complexity of defeasible
logics. It means that every defeasible logic in Nute’s sense
that admits free variables and function symbols, and satis-
fies the Principle of Strong Negation is computable, in con-
trast to the great majority of non-monotonic logics which are
uncomputable. Similarly, if we consider only propositional
logics then, under certain restrictions on the meta-program,
the consequences of a theory can be computed in polyno-
mial time1 Again, this is in contrast to the great majority of
non-monotonic logics.
There are several points of difference between our frame-
work and Nute’s.
• Nute’s framework is committed to a very specific (though
natural) notion of failure-to-prove: the one corresponding
to the Kunen semantics. Our framework is not restricted
in this way.
• Nute’s framework is able to express logics that violate the
Principle of Strong Negation, whereas ours cannot.
• By admitting arbitrary inference rules (in addition to the
monotonic kernel) but requiring coherence, Nute’s frame-
work places the burden of proof that the result is a de-
feasible logic on the logic designer. Every logic designed
within our framework is coherent.
• The setting of Nute’s framework makes it extremely dif-
ficult to handle defeasible rules containing free variables
and function symbols. These can be handled very natu-
rally in the meta-programming framework.
• It is not clear whether the four tags are intended to be the
only tags admissible in Nute’s framework or not. In the
following section, we will demonstrate the advantage of
admitting other tags.
• There are some technical differences between Nute’s
framework and DL, concerning the relative priority of
strict and defeasible rules in cases where antecedents are
known defeasibly. These arise from Nute’s monotonic
kernel, which has some differences with the inference
rules in DL.
New Defeasible Logics
We now develop several variations of DL. Our interest here
is not to develop definitive defeasible logics, but to demon-
strate the flexibility of the framework, and the beginnings
1Indeed, DL has been shown to have linear complexity (Anto-
niou, Billington, Maher and Rock 2000).
of a methodology for designing logics. We have already,
in (Maher and Governatori 1999), defined an extension of
DL to allow a failure operator in the body of rules without
disturbing the semantics of DL on theories without this op-
erator. To keep this paper brief, we ignore definite inference
in this section. A key element of the definition of the logics
is the notion of support, used as part of Wagner’s analysis of
defeasible reasoning (Wagner 1991), so we begin by finding
an appropriate definition of support.
Support
Support for a literal p consists of a chain of reasoning that
would lead us to conclude p in the absence of conflicts. If
we ignore the superiority relation we could define it simply
as follows.
c7 supported(X):-
definitely(X).
c8 supported(X):-
supportive rule(R,X, [Y1, . . . , Yn]),
supported(Y1),. . . ,supported(Yn).
However, in situations where two conflicting rules can be
applied and one rule is inferior to another, the inferior rule
should not be counted as supporting its conclusion. Thus we
refine c8:
c9 supported(X):-
supportive rule(R,X, [Y1, . . . , Yn]),
supported(Y1),. . . ,supported(Yn),
not beaten(R,X).
c10 beaten(R,X):-
rule(S,∼X, [W1, . . . ,Wn]),
defeasibly(W1),. . . ,defeasibly(Wn),
sup(S,R).
Notice that, because the definition of support is recur-
sive, we would not be able to express it in the proof theories
of (Nute 1994; Billington 1993) without additional tags.
Ambiguity Propagation
A literal is ambiguous if there is a chain of reasoning that
supports a conclusion that p is true, another that supports
that ¬p is true, and the superiority relation does not resolve
this conflict.
Example 1 The following is a classic example of non-
monotonic inheritance.
r1 :⇒ quaker
r2 :⇒ republican
r3 : quaker ⇒ pacifist
r4 : republican⇒ ¬pacifist
r5 : republican⇒ footballfan
r6 : pacifist⇒ antimilitary
r7 : footballfan⇒ ¬antimilitary
The priority relation is empty.
pacifist is ambiguous since the combination of r1 and r3
support pacifist and the combination of r2 and r4 support
¬pacifist. Similarly, antimilitary is ambiguous.
In DL, the ambiguity of pacifist results in the conclu-
sions −∂pacifist and −∂¬pacifist. Since r6 is conse-
quently not applicable, DL concludes +∂¬antimilitary.
This behaviour is called ambiguity blocking, since the am-
biguity of antimilitary has been blocked by the conclu-
sion −∂pacifist and an unambiguous conclusion about
antimilitary has been drawn.
A preference for ambiguity blocking or ambiguity propa-
gating behaviour is one of the properties of non-monotonic
inheritance nets over which intuitions can clash (Touretzky,
Horty and Thomason 1987). Stein (Stein 1992) argues that
ambiguity blocking results in an unnatural pattern of con-
clusions in extensions of the above example. Ambiguity
propagation results in fewer conclusions being drawn, which
might make it preferable when the cost of an incorrect con-
clusion is high. For these reasons an ambiguity propagating
variant of DL is of interest.
We can achieve ambiguity propagation behaviour by mak-
ing a minor change to clause c5 so that it now considers sup-
port to be sufficient to allow a superior rule to overrule an
inferior rule.
c11 overruled(R,X):-
rule(S,∼ X, [U1, . . . , Un]),
supported(U1),. . . ,supported(Un),
not defeated(S,∼ X).
Proposition 6 The resulting logic is consistent.
Applying this logic to the example above, all literals
mentioned in the theory (both positive and negated) are
supported. As in DL, we conclude −∂pacifist and
−∂¬pacifist, since r3 and r4 overrule each other. We
also conclude +∂footballfan and−∂antimilitary for es-
sentially the same reason as in DL. However this logic
differs from DL and propagates ambiguity by concluding
−∂¬antimilitary, since r7 is overruled by r6 and r7 can-
not defeat r6.
Team Defeat
The defeasible logics we have considered so far incorporate
the idea of team defeat. That is, an attack on a rule with
head p by a rule with head ∼ p may be defeated by a dif-
ferent rule with head p (see inference rule +∂ and clauses
c5 and c6). Even though the idea of team defeat is natural,
it is worth noting that several related approaches, such as
LPwNF (Dimopoulos and Kakas 1995) and most argumen-
tation frameworks, do not adopt this idea. It is easy to define
defeasible logics without team defeat in our framework. For
our original defeasible logic (c1–c6) this can be achieved by
replacing c5 and c6 by the following clause.
c12 overruled(R,X):-
rule(S,∼ X, [U1, . . . , Un]),
defeasibly(U1),. . . ,defeasibly(Un),
not sup(R,S).
Proposition 7 The resulting logic is consistent.
It is important to note that the two techniques demon-
strated here are orthogonal, in the sense that they can be ap-
plied individually or in combination, without prejudice. For
example, we may define an ambiguity propagating defeasi-
ble logic without team defeat. This is achieved by replacing
the clauses c11 and c6 by the following new one:
c13 overruled(R,X):-
rule(S,∼ X, [U1, . . . , Un]),
supported(U1),. . . ,supported(Un),
not sup(R,S).
Proposition 8 The resulting logic is consistent.
In this sense we have established a tunable framework in
which a defeasible logic may be designed according to the
specific needs of the problem at hand.
Relationships
In this section we wish to establish relationships among
some of the variants we introduced in this paper. We will
show that there exists a chain of increasing expressive power
among several of the logics. We will be considering the fol-
lowing tags:
• ∆, which denotes strict provability (c1, c2).
• ∂a,ntd, which denotes defeasible provability in the ambi-
guity propagating logic without team defeat (c1–c4, c13).
• ∂a, which denotes defeasible provability in the the am-
biguity propagating defeasible logic (c1–c4, c7, c9, c10,
c11,c6).
• ∂, which denotes defeasible provability in our original de-
feasible logic (c1–c6).
• Σ, which denotes support in our original defeasible logic
(c7, c9, c10).
Then we are able to prove the following:
Theorem 9 +∆ ⊂ +∂a,ntd ⊂ +∂a ⊂ +∂ ⊂ +Σ.
Each inclusion is strict, in the sense that there are defea-
sible theories in which the inclusion is strict.
We wish to point out that this result is deeper that it may
look on the surface. For example, the relation +∂a,ntd ⊂
+∂a appears trivial since the absence of team defeat makes
the logic weaker. But notice that when the logic fails to
prove a literal p and instead proves−∂p, then that result may
be used by the logic to prove another literal q that could not
be proven if p were provable. In fact it is easily seen that de-
feasible provability in the original defeasible logic without
team defeat is not weaker than defeasible provability with
team defeat. Consider the following example:
Example 2
r1 :⇒ p
r2 :⇒ p
r3 :⇒ ¬p
r4 :⇒ ¬p
r5 : p⇒ ¬q
r6 :⇒ q
r1 > r3, r2 > r4
Then q is not defeasibly provable in the original defeasi-
ble logic, but defeasibly provable in the logic without team
defeat.
Conclusion
We have developed a framework for defeasible logics that
admits a wide range of logics. We have demonstrated the
flexibility of the framework and the beginnings of a design
methodology by developing, in a straightforward way, vari-
ants of DL which are, respectively, ambiguity propagating
and incapable of team defeat. All logics designed within the
framework are coherent.
The uniform setting provided by logic meta-programming
supports the easy combination of logics that are based on
the same form of failure. We have a proposal for combining
logics with different notions of failure, based on the module
system of (Maher 1993), but we have no space to present it
here.
In summary, our framework provides a tunable family of
defeasible logics.
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